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LOBSTER CO-MANAGEMENT LAW

Evolution
of the
Maine Lobster
Co-management
Law

In fisheries management circles, there is growing realization
that traditional ways of managing marine resources are not
working and that new approaches to management need to
be tried. One of the most promising of these new approaches is co-management, where authority for managing fish
stocks is shared between the industry and government agencies. This paper discusses the implementation of the new
co-management system, which was initiated in the Maine

by James M. Acheson
Terry Stockwell

lobster industry in 1995.



The law has clearly been

successful; it has been framed in a way to allow lobster fishermen to be able to generate rules to constrain their own

James A.Wilson

exploitative effort. At the same time, a number of problems
have come to the fore, not the least of which was the fact
that passage of one regulatory measure caused problems for
certain groups of fishermen who demanded remedial legislation. Thus, the co-management effort in Maine has moved
ahead by solving a sequence of problems. But the fact that
these problems are being solved places Maine in the forefront of jurisdictions experimenting with new ways to manage fisheries. Those interested in fisheries management may
want to recall the state’s motto “Dirigo”—“I lead.”
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INTRODUCTION

he twenty-first century opens on the specter of
destroyed fisheries. Nearly every major fishery in
the industrialized world, and many in the developing
world, are experiencing declining stocks and reduced
catches (McGoodwin, 1990; Murawski, et al., 1997).
In fisheries management circles there is a growing realization that traditional techniques of managing marine
fisheries have not worked well. This has led to an interest in new approaches to conserving marine resources.
One of the most controversial of these new techniques
is “co-management,” in which responsibility and
authority for conserving marine species is shared
between agencies of the government and members
of the fishing industry (Pinkerton, 1989). Proponents
argue that co-management will conserve resources
while maintaining political support in the industry,
so that enforcement costs are substantially reduced
(McCay and Jentoft, 1996). According to its detractors,
co-management can hardly succeed since it requires
fishermen to voluntarily restrain their own exploitative
activities (tantamount to putting the fox in charge of
the henhouse). Since only a few co-management systems have been established, very little information exists
about the way these governance regimes have worked.
Recently, a co-management law was passed by the
Maine Legislature for the Maine lobster industry. It is
one of the first co-management governance structures
in the world. All those interested in co-management
have much to learn from the Maine lobster fishery case.
The Maine lobster industry is important for still
another reason. It is one of the world’s most successful
fisheries. In an era in which most of the world’s most
important fisheries are in a state of crisis, the lobster
fishery is experiencing unprecedented successes. Despite
heavy fishing effort, the lobster catch in Maine has
remained very stable since 1947, when the current
catch records program came into being, averaging
about twenty million pounds. Since 1989, lobster
catches have been in excess of thirty million pounds
annually (State of Maine Department of Marine
Resources, 1995), and in the last three years have
exceeded forty-seven million pounds. While there is
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no agreement about the cause of these
high catches, knowledgeable observers
industry has a
believe that they are due in some measure to a long history of effective regulation of the industry (Acheson, 1997;
120-year history
Acheson and Steneck, 1997). A key
question is this: How and why are regof effective regulations developed in the lobster industry? While this is a complicated
question, two observations can be
ulation, in which
made. First, the lobster industry has a
120-year history of effective regulation,
the fishing
in which the fishing industry played a
1
key role (Acheson, 1997). Virtually all
of the rules in place are the result of
industry played
lobbying pressure by industry factions,
including the minimum size law, the
a key role.
oversize measure, the V-notch program,
and the escape vent. Many university
scientists and industry members are
convinced these laws are effective in
conserving the resource. Although a number of ideas
for these laws came originally from scientists, they
were not enacted into law until they had the support
of powerful industry factions. Second, the process by
which legislation is developed for the industry is not
the result of cool, detached contemplation by people
with scientific facts and an interest in conserving the
resource. Rather, it is the result of a series of distribution fights between industry factions interested in
promulgating rules to ensure differential access to the
lobster resource. If fishermen are interested in conservation, they are often more interested in conserving the
resource for themselves. The development of the comanagement law can only be understood against a
background of that history.
BRIEF HISTORY OF THE MAINE LOBSTER
ZONE MANAGEMENT LAW

he co-management law for the Maine lobster
industry, popularly known as the “zone management law,” was enacted by the Maine Legislature in the
spring of 1995. It was a broad-based law that changed
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many aspects of regulation. It established an individual
trap limit of 1,200 traps by the year 2000; a trap tag
system to identify owners of traps; an apprenticeship
program for new entrants into the lobster fishery; and
eligibility criteria to qualify for a commercial lobster
and crab license. Most important, it was designed to
give the lobster industry control over certain aspects
of management, while retaining most authority for
management in the hands of the Department of
Marine Resources and the legislature. This law established a framework by which the Commissioner of
Marine Resources could create lobster policy management zones. These lobster zones are managed by an
elected council of lobster license holders. The 1995
law gave these councils power to propose rules on
three things: (1) the maximum number of traps each
license holder is permitted to fish (a trap limit); (2) the
number of traps that may be fished on a single line;
and (3) the time of day when lobster fishing is
allowed. If the proposed rules are passed by a vote of
two-thirds of the license holders in the zone, the zone
council is obligated to convey the results of the referenda to the Commissioner of Marine Resources. If the
commissioner judges them to be “reasonable,” the rules
will become departmental regulations enforceable by
the warden force (Alden, 1995; Jones, 1995). In 1999,
the zone councils were given an additional power,
namely the power to recommend the number of fishermen in their zone (i.e. limited entry). This can be done
by a zone council recommending to the commissioner
a ratio of entrants to retirees in the zone. Here again,
the commissioner has the power to make these suggested rules regulations.
During 1995 and 1996, when the law was being
passed and the initial implementation committee was at
work, there were many predictions that the “zones law”
would fail. The senior author recalls a conversation
with an ex-legislator who had served several terms on
the marine resources committee. He said, “This law is
designed to fail. You can’t expect lobster fishermen to
cut their own effort. If this law passes, you will have a
big dog fight up and down the coast.”
In great part the predictions of disaster were rooted in the legislative history of the industry. By giving
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the zone councils power to make recommendations
on trap limits, fishing time, numbers of traps on a line,
and limited entry, the legislature was divesting itself of
several vexing, long-term problems. All of these rights
given to the zone councils involve very contentious
issues. Although the legislature has tried repeatedly, it
has had problems framing legislation on these issues or
has failed to come up with acceptable legislation at all.
The issue of trap limits and limited entry have long
proved to be intractable. Between 1956 and 1995,
seventeen legislatures have dealt with trap limit bills.
There were three attempts to get limited entry legislation beginning in 1974, with the so called GreenlawJackson bill. All were defeated. The basic problem was
a lack of consensus in the lobster industry, which
quickly translated into a lack of political support for
these bills in the legislature. Members of the legislature
were wise enough to see that a one-size-fits-them-allpolicy was not going to work in a heterogeneous
industry. Much of the support for the zone management law came from legislators and fishermen frustrated with the long stalemate concerning attempts to get
a trap limit for the entire state. It was thought that if
it were not possible to get a statewide trap limit law,
it might be possible to get people in a zone to agree
on a trap limit.
Despite the predictions of disaster, implementation
of the zone management law went ahead rapidly.
By April 1997, an implementation committee and the
appointed interim zone councils had done their job.
Seven zones and their boundaries were established (see
Figure 1), bylaws for the zone councils were written,
election districts within zones were established, and the
election of permanent zone council member was organized (Jones, 1997). The permanent zone councils
began their work in the summer of 1997.
Five years after the zone management law was
passed, it is clear that the criers of doom were wrong.
The co-management law has clearly been a success so
far. By the summer of 1998, all seven of the zones
had passed trap limits of 600 or 800 traps. By July
2000, five of the seven zones (i.e., zones B, D, E, F, G)
had started the process to get limited entry rules for
their zones, and many hearings were being held on this
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Figure 1:
Map of the Seven Lobster Zones, March 1977

issue during the summer of 2000. This means that
those involved in the zone management process have
broken the long stalemate that had bedeviled efforts to
get a statewide trap limit and limited entry legislation,
by allowing fishermen in different parts of the coast
to promulgate rules acceptable in their local area.
PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS

he evolution of the rules stemming from the lobster zone process reflects two closely related
processes. First, the development of these rules was
motivated by a concern with distributional issues. As
we shall see, all of the important problems addressed
by the zone management councils and the rules passed
to solve those problems pertain to who gets access to
the resource. Second, promulgating a rule for solving
one kind of distributional problem caused another;
and the solution of that one caused still another. These
problems are being successfully addressed, but it is still
important to recognize the sequential aspect of this
problem solving process.

Problem 1: Trap Limits
Since the end of World War II, the number of
traps in Maine waters has steadily increased due primarily to competition among fishermen. Since that
time a growing number of people in the industry have
been calling for a trap limit, arguing that a ceiling on
the number of traps that could be used would benefit
everyone. The argument goes there are only so many
harvestable-size lobsters. Why pay for one thousand
traps when everyone will catch the same number of
lobsters if they have five hundred traps? Harvesters
would catch as many lobsters if everyone had the smaller number of traps, but fuel, bait and labor costs would
be lower, and trap congestion would be less. Moreover,
2
there also might be some conservation benefits.
Although there has been general agreement on the
desirability of a trap limit, the decades-long effort to
get such a law passed has always foundered on two
issues. First, there is a strong feeling that a trap limit
will do no good unless it is coupled with a limit on
licenses (“limited entry”). The logic is that a trap limit
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will not relieve congestion if new entrants come into
the industry, bringing with them thousands of new
traps. However, limited entry has long been received
with ambivalence; such regulations would discourage
young people from entering the lobster fishery, one of
the prime employment possibilities available in many
coastal towns (Acheson, 1975).

Fall 2000 · MAINE POLICY REVIEW · 55

LOBSTER CO-MANAGEMENT LAW

Second, and more important, while the majority
of fishermen have agreed that there should be a limit
on traps, no one was able to agree on what that limit
should be. Part of the problem is that the average number of traps fished varies widely from one part of the
coast to another. A trap limit that would be acceptable
to people in eastern Maine—where six hundred traps
is considered a large number—would be completely
unacceptable in an area such as Casco Bay, where, until

When the permanent zone councils went
into operation in the summer of 1997, the
first serious issue they tackled was trap limits.
recently, fishermen were commonly using over 1,800
traps. Moreover, within each town the so-called “fulltime” fishermen generally fish far more traps than the
“part-timers,” for whom lobster fishing is not the primary source of income. Thus, attempts to get trap limits engender two sources of conflict: between different
areas of the coast and between full- and part-time
fishermen in any single harbor (Acheson and Wilson,
1996). This led to a lack of consensus among license
holders and a general lack of support for any trap limit
proposal in the legislature.
When the permanent zone councils went into
operation in the summer of 1997, the first serious issue
they tackled was trap limits. In every zone, there were
a large number of fishermen with small- and mediumsized operations who had grown tired of watching
“big fishermen” or “hogs” take a disproportionate
amount of the catch and cause an untold number of
gear tangles. Further, there was increasing recognition
that the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission
(ASMFC), which had recently taken over lobster management beyond the three-mile zone, was likely to
impose some kind of trap limit. Many people in the
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industry used the threat of ASMFC intervention to
bolster the arguments for a trap limit. This sentiment
was well known to the zone council members, who
proceeded to act on it. In August 1997, Zone E voted
to establish an 800 trap limit by 1998, a 700 trap limit
by 1999, and a 600 trap limit by 2000. In September,
Zone G had passed an 800 trap limit by 2000, and in
October a 600 trap limit (Commercial Fisheries News,
3
1997). The rest of the zones followed in the next
few months. By the summer of 1998, all of the zones
had held referenda in which trap limits were passed.
The passage of trap limits greatly exacerbated the
hostility between those who fished a lot of traps and
those with medium and small operations. Before trap
limits, “small fishermen” resented “hogs”; after the trap
limit votes, it was the “big fishermen” who were resentful of their friends and neighbors who had voted
against their interests.
The reason for the hostility of the “big fishermen”
is rooted in a number of distributional concerns.
Trap limits, or trap caps, do not constrain all fishermen.
They force those fishing over the allowable maximum
number of traps to reduce the number they fish. This
is likely to affect the “big fishermen,” who fish a large
amount of gear, and may not force the “small” or
“average” fishermen to make any changes at all. However, in the process the relative percentage of traps
“small fishermen” have on the bottom is increased,
giving them a higher percentage of the overall catch.
Not only were the fishermen with small- and
medium-sized operations not required to reduce traps;
even more galling was the fact that they were not
restricted from increasing the amount of traps they
fished. Many of them took advantage of this opportunity, which resulted in the number of traps in use in
the state increasing after the zone management law was
passed (Acheson, in press). Even worse, many commercial fishermen were moving into the lobster fishery on
a full-time basis; while landings in most other fisheries
declined, they were attracted by the record high lobster
landings achieved in the late 1980s and the 1990s. In
1978, approximately 20% of all lobster license-holders
were considered “full-time fishermen”; in 1997, an esti-
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mated 58.3% earned 75-100% of their income from
the lobster fishery, attesting to the huge growth in the
numbers of full-time fishermen (Acheson and Acheson,
1998). In short, although lobster catches increased
phenomenally in the past decade, the established “big
fishermen” saw a disturbing proportion of that increase
going to people with small- and medium-sized operations and to newcomers to the industry—all at a time
when they were forced to cut the amount of gear they
fished. Under these conditions, it is scarcely surprising
that many “big fishermen” were angry, feeling that the
trap limit was working against them, and benefitting
their competitors.
This hostility between so called “full-time fishermen” (with a lot of traps), and “part-time fishermen”
is unquestionably the most serious problem with which
the zone councils have had to deal, and it has cast a
shadow over all deliberations and actions of the zone
councils ever since.

Problem 2: Limited Entry
The “big fishermen” reacted to the passage of trap
limits by working for rules to benefit themselves. They
first fought back using strategies which were largely
ineffective. In Zone G, four fishermen sued the state
over the trap limit votes in that zone, and succeeded
in forcing the state to return to an eight hundred trap
limit (see note 3). In Zones C and F, where many of
the zone council members were “big fishermen,” the
councils refused for months to put a trap limit out
to referendum. In the face of pressure from a large
number of their unhappy constituents and the threat
of oncoming rules from the Atlantic States Marine
Fisheries Commission, which had recently assumed
authority for lobster management outside state waters,
the council finally agreed to hold a referendum in the
spring of 1998.
In the winter of 1998/99, the Lobster Advisory
Council, which has representatives from all zones,
worked on two other ideas eventually passed into law
by the legislature in June 1999. One was a trap tag
freeze, which essentially permitted people fishing under
eight hundred traps to purchase only one hundred

more trap tags then they were issued on November 20,
1998. License holders fishing over eight hundred could
fish no more traps (LD 982). This law went into effect
in September 1999.
The other law (LD 1992) established limited entry
by zone. According to this law, limited entry will be
achieved by regulations permitting a ratio of licenses
to be issued for those not renewed in the zone. For
example, a two-to-one ratio would mean that one new
license holder would be allowed to fish in the zone for
every two who did not renew their licenses. This law,
which went into effect in the fall of 1999, specifies a
process by which limited entry rules can be established
4
in each zone.
Both of these laws were motivated, in part, by a
genuine concern with the continual build-up of traps
and with conservation issues. But it needs to be stressed
that both were also designed to further the objectives
of the fishermen with large amounts of gear. That is,
they would stop entry into the industry (especially
in the overcrowded western zones) and prevent “parttimers” from building up the amount of gear they fish
while “full-time fishermen” are being forced to reduce
their trap numbers.
In the spring of 2000, Zone D, E, F and G councils all voted to recommend limited entry in their
zones, and suggested a ratio of the new licenses to be
issue for those who left the industry. Zone B is currently holding its survey. In all of these zones limited entry
is likely to be put into effect by George LaPointe, the
Commissioner of Marine Resources. What was not
foreseen was that passage of limited entry rules would
exacerbate zone boundary problems.

Problem 3: Boundary Problems
The initial committee charged with implementing
the zone management law thought no serious disputes
would result from the establishment of zone boundaries, since these boundaries would coincide with exist5
ing informal territorial boundaries. That is, the zone
boundaries were placed to overlap with the established
boundaries of the areas claimed and defended by the
groups fishing from each harbor. Moreover, the zone
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rules made it possible for people to fish in two zones,
providing they fish according to the rules of the most
restrictive zone.
Unfortunately, all seven zones have become
involved in boundary disputes since the passage of limited entry legislation. All of the disputes are between
people from one zone who want to fish in places where
they had traditionally fished and others who want to
use the new zone boundaries to keep them out. Access
to lobster bottom was the issue in all cases, even
though the exact cause was not quite the same.
The disputes between Zones F, G, C and D
stemmed from the fact that zone boundaries were
drawn which allegedly bisect a traditional fishing
ground. These disputes did not immediately come to
a head; since these four zones had the same trap limit,
the fishermen were free to place traps where they had
always fished. However, with the passage of the limited entry by zone law in 1999, all of this was to
change. With limited entry came the realization that
boundaries would have to be made impermeable. One
could not have limited entry in a zone if one allowed
license holders to cross the border and fish in that zone
with impunity. Thus, the so-called “49%/51%” rule was
passed, limiting fishermen from one zone to placing a
maximum of 49% of their gear in the area of another
zone. This would severely limit the activities of some
individuals from Zone D who, in the winter, had
placed a lot of traps in the offshore waters of Zone C,
and other men from Zone F, who, in the winter, had
long placed most of their gear in waters now in Zone
G. People from the two disadvantaged zones objected
mightily, even though a majority of the people from
all zones in question favored limited entry.
The dispute between Zones D and E stemmed
from a slightly different cause. Zone E passed a six
hundred trap limit, which was more restrictive than the
eight hundred trap limit of Zone D. This meant that
people from Zone E could fish to the east of the
boundary (Pemaquid Point), but those from Zone D
could not place traps to the west of that boundary.
The Zone D fishermen were incensed over this turn of
events, since it seemed unfair to them that they would
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be stopped from fishing in areas where they had always
gone. But this dispute was like the other two boundary
disputes in that all three were the result of disputes
over access to productive lobster bottom. The Zone C
and D dispute—and the Zone D and E disputes—were
settled in the winter of 2000 by negotiations between
the involved zone councils and the Department of
Marine Resources, in which “buffer zones” were established where fishermen from both zones could fish.
The Zone F and G dispute continues at this writing.
In the winter of 2000, Rep. David Etnier
(Harpswell) introduced a bill designed to solve boundary disputes stemming from the “49%/51%” rule. This
bill would have limited the authority of the zones and
zone councils to the three-mile zone. Outside three
miles, traps could be placed anywhere, which would
have allowed most people to continue fishing where
they had always gone. This bill was passed in the
House late in the spring of 2000, but was defeated in
the Senate. Had it passed, it would have resulted in still
other problems demanding solution at a later date. For
example, it would have made it possible for a person
with a license in one zone to fish in any zone providing that he kept only 49% of the traps within three
miles and had 51% outside the three-mile line. Such
people could have circumvented the entire limitedentry program.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

he Maine co-management law has clearly been successful; it has permitted the members of the lobster
industry to get two rules that many industry members
have desired for a long time, namely trap limits and
limited-entry laws. Another measure of success is that
members of the zone councils, Department of Marine
Resources, and the Maine Legislature have been very
successful in solving the problems that have been
caused by implementation of the lobster co-management law.
The passage of these laws was motivated in some
part by a concern with conservation, but a much more
pressing motive has been a desire to get rules that
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would benefit one industry faction over another. Once
the zones system was established, trap limits were
quickly voted into existence with the overwhelming
support of small- and medium-sized fishermen who
gained from trap limits.
The “big fishermen” reacted to the trap limits by
lobbying successfully for the passage of a limited-entry
law and trap tag freeze. These two laws were designed
to stop an increasing amount of the catch going to
“small fishermen” and to new entrants into the industry.
However, passage of the limited-entry law containing
the “49%/51%” provision prohibited many fishermen
from placing large amounts of traps in areas they had
fished for a long time. This caused boundary problems
which have not yet been completely solved. There is
little doubt that the way these boundary problems are
solved will cause still other problems. Limited-entry
legislation and the trap tag freeze will also likely cause
conflict between those in the industry and people who
would like to enter lobstering and build up the amount
of gear they can fish.
There is nothing unusual about this situation.
Knight (1992) argues that most rules and laws are generated by negotiations over distribution of goods, services, and resources. The same process generating rules
for the lobster industry can be seen in virtually all
industries and communities. Moreover, those familiar
with the legislative process know that legislation
almost always needs fine tuning, or remedial legislation.
This is a normal part of the evolutionary process.
The fact that the zone council process has succeeded in solving a whole series of problems should not
obscure the difficulties involved. It is always very difficult for people to pass rules or laws to constrain themselves. Successful passage of these trap limits and
limited-entry rules has been the result of months of
long, painful, and sometime acrimonious negotiations.
These negotiations have been made all the more difficult by the fact that zone councils are comprised of
people from different harbors, those men and women
who have traditionally been competitors for fishing
bottom (Acheson, 1988). They have been further exacerbated by the fact that the zone councils have had to

The idea that

bridge two different cultures, that of
the fishermen and the subculture of the
fishermen never
legislators and Department of Marine
Resources. The fact that these rules have
been passed by the zone council
will pass rules
process attests to the skill, negotiating
ability, and dedication of those
to constrain
involved in the process.
Co-management has certainly been
a success in the Maine lobster industry.
themselves is
The idea that fishermen never will pass
rules to constrain themselves is clearly
clearly wrong.
wrong. Under certain conditions, they
will pass rules in the long-term common good. The Maine Legislature has
Under certain
passed a law that has motivated many
people in the industry to do just that.
conditions, they
Can co-management solve the
resource management problems in other
fisheries in the world? We are certainly
will pass rules in
hopeful, particularly in view of the fact
that co-management has also worked
the long-term
in a few other places in the world
(see Pinkerton and Weinstein, 1995).
However, a caveat is in order. The lobcommon good.
ster industry has a long history of
successfully approaching the legislature
for conservation laws (Acheson, 1997;
Acheson and Knight, 2000), and its
members have a marked conservation ethic. Other
fishing industries certainly do not. Many operate with
a “gold rush mentality” in which people strive to get
as many fish as possible as quickly as possible with no
thought of tomorrow. Can co-management work in
these industries? The answer to this question is not
obvious, because social scientists have not answered
two fundamental and connected questions: Under what
conditions will people develop rules to constrain themselves for mutual benefit? And, second: When will the
users of natural resources develop a conservation ethic?
Recently there has been a lot of work on these questions and progress has been made in addressing them
(Ostrom, 1990). However, it is becoming obvious these
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are complicated issues with no obvious answers (Elster,
1989; Knight, 1992). Still, they may be the most
important question facing resource management in the
next few years.
What is the future of the Maine co-management
effort? Certainly future success will necessitate the
continued support of the industry and the willingness
of fishermen to sacrifice a lot of time to serve as zone
council chairs and members. We suspect that the zone
councils will continue to be well served. Unfortunately,
the future of the industry does not depend only on the
members of the lobster industry. It also depends on the
activities of government at several different levels.
If there is anything social scientists have learned about

…the United States is going in the exact opposite
direction it should be going if we wish to develop
co-management governance structures…
co-management in general it is that lack of support by
government agencies can be the death knell of such
programs (Jentoft, 1989).
We have no doubt that the lobster zone management law would not have passed through the legislative
process had it not been for the support of former
Commissioner Robin Alden. There can also be little
doubt that an unsympathetic commissioner with good
bureaucratic skills could kill such a program, especially
in the early stages before it has become institutionalized. Such a commissioner would find ample ammunition in the Maine APA (the Administrative Procedures
Act), which gives virtually all power for rulemaking
to top state administrators, who do little to facilitate
“bottom’s up” management. The APA will likely need
to be modified if co-management in Maine is to
achieve its full potential.
Success of the co-management effort will also
depend on activities of the federal agencies enforcing
the conservation laws that have been enacted since the
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1970s. The Marine Mammal Act, the Endangered
Species Act, the Fisheries Conservation and
Management Act, and the recent Sustainable Fisheries
Act give the federal government a high degree of
authority to manage fisheries from the top down. The
passage of these laws means that the United States is
going in the exact opposite direction it should be
going if we wish to develop co-management governance structures. Even worse, the federal government
has the power to overwhelm the lobster zone councils.
After all, there is little sense in zone councils spending
long months negotiating rules, if the feds are going to
dictate what the rules will be.
So little time has elapsed since the passage
of the lobster co-management law in Maine that
little can be said with certainty about its ultimate
fate. However, given the state of the world’s
fisheries, the Maine co-management effort is a
very timely experiment. In a field in which a lot
of armchair theorizing is the rule, the lobster
co-management law provides a case study which
will inform all of those interested in fisheries
management. 
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1.The legislative history of lobster management is
complicated. Each law that was passed involved
different players (i.e., industry factions, legislators,
scientists, the DMR, and, more recently, conservationists and federal agencies) with different interests and interactions.This history has been
covered in detail in two articles, Acheson (1997)
and Acheson and Knight (2000).
2.There is no general consensus concerning the effect
of a trap limit on fishing effort and conservation.
No one in the industry has argued that a trap limit
will do much to conserve lobsters.They believe
trap limits are desirable because they will cut costs
and reduce trap tangles. Some scientists argue that
reducing the number of traps will reduce fishing
effort and conserve lobster.To the best of our
knowledge, there are no data demonstrating that
reducing traps will conserve the resource.
3. In the summer of 1998, Zone G’s trap limit of six
hundred was declared illegal by a judge who ruled
that Zone G’s council had violated its own bylaws
in holding two trap-limit votes within two years.
Thus, Zone G had a one thousand trap limit in
1998, one thousand in 1999, and eight hundred
in 2000.
4. First, the zone council makes a recommendation for
an in/out ratio for the zone to the commissioner.
Then the commissioner freezes the entry of new
license holders for a year.Then a survey is conducted to ascertain the wishes of license holders
in the zone. Last, public hearings are held on the
proposed limited-entry rules.The commissioner
is then empowered to establish a limited-entry
rule for that zone.
5.To go lobster fishing one needs a state license. One
also needs to gain acceptance by the group of
fishermen fishing from the same harbor, which is
sometimes called a “harbor gang.” Once a person
is admitted to a gang, he or she can ordinarily
go fishing only in the territory of that gang.These
groups defend their territories with threats of violence, and, in extreme cases, with the surreptitious
destruction of lobstering gear (Acheson, 1988).
Among state officials, there is tacit acceptance
of the territorial system. Everyone knows it exists,
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but it is accepted as long as violence and destruction of property are kept to a minimum and do
not come to public attention.When violations are
reported, the culprits are prosecuted, long-standing tradition aside.
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